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Non-technical summary 
Many natural resources involve threshold effects. Using these resources beyond a tipping 
point can have disastrous consequences for the environment and human well-being. 
Prominent examples are related to catastrophic climate change, such as the collapse of the 
Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation or the decay of the Greenland ice sheet, and the collapse of 
natural resources, such as fish stocks, grassland, or forests. The potentially dangerous 
consequences have led to a political consensus about the urge of avoiding such thresholds. 
However, these natural tipping points entrench high uncertainty which may seriously affect 
people’s willingness to cooperate in order to prevent catastrophes. 
In this work, we explored the effect of uncertainty on agents’ ability to coordinate their 
cooperative efforts in order to prevent a collective damage. To this end, we conducted a 
laboratory experiment involving a threshold public goods game and compared how 
coordination success was affected by whether the threshold was known or not. In particular, 
we employed four different forms of threshold uncertainty. Whereas two experimental 
treatments involved risk, as the threshold was a random variable with known probability 
distribution, two other treatments involved ambiguity, as the probability distribution of the 
threshold was unknown. 
Our experimental data indicate that threshold uncertainty was detrimental for the provision of 
the public good. Whereas all groups succeeded in preventing the public bad when the 
threshold was known, this result was not replicated in the presence of threshold uncertainty. 
Although the contribution pattern differed depending on how uncertainty was configured, 
contributions were generally lower when players did not know ex-ante the exact threshold 
value. Critically, contributions were particularly low and erratic in the treatments involving 
ambiguity. We also found that early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the 
burden equitably made groups more likely to reach a high public good provision level, even in 
the presence of threshold uncertainty. 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Nutzung vieler natürlicher Ressourcen über einen Schwellenwert („threshold“ oder 
„tipping point“) hinaus kann verheerende Folgen für Umwelt und Mensch mit sich bringen. 
Im Zusammenhang mit katastrophalem Klimawandel sind der Abriss des Golfstroms oder das 
Abschmelzen des Grönländischen Eisschilds bekannte Beispiele. Aber auch andere natürliche 
Ressourcen, wie Fischbestände, Weideland oder Wälder besitzen solche Schwellenwerte. Es 
besteht politischer Konsens darüber, dass das Erreichen solcher Schwellenwerte vermieden 
werden soll, um potentiell gefährliche Folgen abzuwenden. Allerdings sind natürliche 
Schwellenwerte mit hohen Unsicherheiten behaftet, die eine Kooperation zur Vermeidung der 
Katastrophen erschweren könnten.  
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir den Effekt von Unsicherheit auf die Fähigkeit von Akteuren 
ihre kooperativen Anstrengungen zu koordinieren, um einen kollektiven Schaden zu 
vermeiden. Zu diesem Zweck führten wir ein Öffentliches-Gut-Spiel mit Schwellenwert in 
einem Laborexperiment durch und verglichen, ob der Koordinationserfolg durch Kenntnis des 
Schwellenwerts beeinflusst wird. Insbesondere testeten wir vier verschiedene Arten von 
Unsicherheit in Bezug auf den Schwellenwert. Zwei der experimentellen Anordnungen 
beinhalteten Risiko, d.h. der Schwellenwert war durch eine Zufallsvariable mit bekannter 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung charakterisiert. In zwei weiteren Anordnungen waren weder 
der Schwellenwert noch dessen Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung bekannt („ambiguity“). 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich Unsicherheit im Hinblick auf den Schwellenwert negativ auf 
die Bereitstellung des öffentlichen Gutes auswirkt. Während alle Gruppen mit bekanntem 
Schwellenwert erfolgreich den kollektiven Schaden vermieden, konnte dieses Ergebnis unter 
Unsicherheit nicht reproduziert werden. Obwohl sich die Bereitschaft einen Beitrag zu leisten 
je nach Konfiguration der Unsicherheit unterschied, waren die Beiträge generell niedriger, 
wenn den Spielern der genaue Schwellenwert nicht von Anfang an bekannt war. Die Beiträge 
waren besonders niedrig und schwankend, wenn zusätzlich auch die 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung des Schwellenwerts unbekannt war. Das Experiment zeigte 
darüber hinaus, dass – selbst unter Unsicherheit – eine hohe Bereitstellung des öffentlichen 
Gutes erreicht wurde, wenn die Akteure frühzeitig die eigene Bereitschaft zum Beitragen 
signalisierten und Lasten gleichmäßig verteilt waren.   
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Abstract 
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a 
threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good 
when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for 
the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe 
when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of 
the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to 
contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty. 
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1 Introduction 
Many natural resources involve threshold effects. Using these resources beyond a tipping 
point can have disastrous consequences for the environment and human well-being (Lenton et 
al. 2008). Prominent examples are related to catastrophic climate change, such as the collapse 
of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation or the decay of the Greenland ice sheet, and the 
collapse of natural resources, such as fish stocks, grassland, or forests. The potentially 
dangerous consequences have led to a political consensus about the urge of avoiding such 
thresholds.  However, these natural tipping points entrench high uncertainty (Kriegler et al. 
2009, Alley et al. 2003, Scheffer et al. 2001) which may seriously affect people’s willingness 
to cooperate in order to prevent catastrophes. 
In this work, we explored the effect of uncertainty on agents’ ability to coordinate their 
cooperative efforts in order to prevent a collective damage. To this end, we conducted a 
laboratory experiment involving a threshold public goods game. In a typical threshold public 
goods game, each player in a group receives an endowment and decides how much of it to 
contribute to a public good. If the group contribution exceeds a certain threshold, then the 
public good is provided and each player receives a fixed amount of money, no matter how 
much she contributed to the public good. If the threshold is not reached, contributions are not 
returned to the players.1 
Threshold public goods games have been studied theoretically for a long time, and in 
particular it is known that differently from continuous public goods games, Pareto-optimal 
outcomes are supportable as Nash equilibria (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989, Palfrey and 
Rosenthal 1984). Uncertain thresholds, however, can lead to free-riding and ultimately to 
inefficient equilibria (Nitzan and Romano 1990, Suleiman 1997). McBride (2006) considered 
changes in the probability distribution of the threshold under various public good values. He 
found that voluntary contributions do not relate monotonically to uncertainty. In particular, 
increasing uncertainty through a mean-preserving spread leads to higher contributions if the 
value of the public good is sufficiently high. On the other hand, an increase in uncertainty 
leads to lower contributions if the public good value is relatively low. Barrett (2011b) showed 
that threshold uncertainty changes the nature of the cooperation problem in a climate change 
game. Provided that the climate change damage is large (compared to the costs of avoiding it) 
                                                            
1 There are also threshold public goods games with refunding if the provision point is not met (e.g. Spencer et al. 
2009, Rondeau et al. 2005) or a rebate beyond the provision point (e.g. Isaac et al. 1985). For an overview see 
Croson and Marks (2000). 
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and the threshold is certain, the challenge requires only coordination of efforts because 
preventing the damage is both collectively optimal and a Nash equilibrium. With threshold 
uncertainty, in contrast, cooperation is needed and difficult to enforce because the social 
optimum is not supportable as Nash equilibrium.  
Some experimental studies tried to shed further light on how uncertainty affects cooperative 
outcomes. McBride (2010) found that threshold uncertainty hampers cooperation when the 
value of the public good is relatively low, although the opposite can happen for higher public 
good values. It has also been shown that the effect of threshold uncertainty can depend on the 
mean of the threshold distribution, such that uncertainty helps (hinders) cooperation when the 
mean is high (low) (Suleiman et al. 2001). Whereas Kotani et al. (2010) confirmed that high 
levels of threshold uncertainty hamper cooperation, their evidence suggests that moderate 
levels of uncertainty can be beneficial. Environmental uncertainty has also been explored by 
researchers in resource dilemmas, who generally found that uncertainty is detrimental for 
collective outcomes. The more uncertain people are regarding the size of the available 
resource, the more likely they are to overharvest from that resource (Budescu et al. 1990, 
Gustafsson et al. 1998, Rapoport et al. 1992, Wit and Wilke 1998). 
These previous experiments manipulated uncertainty solely by widening the threshold interval 
(or the resource or group size), thus ignoring the potential peculiarities of different kinds of 
threshold distribution. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
investigation of the effect of threshold ambiguity: How are collective outcomes in a threshold 
public goods game affected if the probability distribution of the threshold is unknown to the 
players? 
The debate on the distinction between risk (known probability distribution) and ambiguity 
(unknown probability distribution) has a long theoretical tradition (Knight 1921, Savage 
1954). Starting from the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) researchers have begun to explore 
extensively individuals’ attitudes and behavioral responses toward ambiguity, typically 
revealing aversion to situations in which probabilities are unknown (e.g., Chow and Sarin 
2002, Slovic and Tversky 1974; see Camerer and Weber 1992 for a review). Some authors 
explored how behavior in games changes when players’ perception of others’ decisions is 
ambiguous (Bailey, Eichberger, and Kelsey 2005, Eichberger and Kelsey 2002, Eichberger, 
Kelsey, and Schipper 2008), and found that players cope with strategic ambiguity by choosing 
more secure actions. However, we found no evidence on the consequences of environmental 
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ambiguity, e.g. how ignoring the probability distribution of the threshold affects players’ 
behavior in a public goods game. 
In our laboratory experiment we compared how coordination success in a threshold public 
goods game was affected by whether the threshold was known or not. In particular, we 
employed four different forms of threshold uncertainty. Whereas two experimental treatments 
involved risk, as the threshold was a random variable with known probability distribution, two 
other treatments involved ambiguity, as the probability distribution of the threshold was 
unknown. 
A prominent goal of our study was to reproduce those real-world setups in which agents such 
as individuals or communities need to coordinate their cooperative efforts in order to prevent 
an undesirable event. Accordingly, our setup deviated from traditional threshold public goods 
games in three important ways. First, players contributed to the common account not to 
realize a gain but to avoid a loss. If the group contribution did not reach a certain amount of 
money, all members lost almost all of their remaining endowments. Second, the provision of 
the public good was sequential, as the assessment of the group effectiveness in preventing the 
public bad was carried out only after multiple stages of contributions. This allowed for the 
examination of how players in a group reacted to the fellow members’ behavior under 
different uncertainty configurations. Third, we implemented a simple possibility to 
communicate, as players could suggest non-binding proposals for the group’s targeted 
contribution (Tavoni et al. 2011). 
Lastly, note that a threshold public goods game like this one differs from the majority of 
games used to investigate global environmental cooperation problems (Finus 2001). 
Specifically, the problem of enforcement is facilitated by the “disastrous” consequences of 
contributing less than the threshold. The traditional formulation, in contrast, does not include 
catastrophes but only gradual effects. 
Our experimental data indicate that threshold uncertainty was detrimental for the provision of 
the public good. Whereas all groups succeeded in preventing the public bad when the 
threshold was known, this result was not replicated in the presence of threshold uncertainty. 
Although the contribution pattern differed depending on how uncertainty was configured, 
contributions were generally lower when players did not know ex-ante the exact threshold 
value. Critically, contributions were particularly low and erratic in the treatments involving 
ambiguity. We also found that early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the 
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burden equitably made groups more likely to reach a high public good provision level, even in 
the presence of threshold uncertainty. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes in detail our game and the 
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 discusses the equilibria of the game. Section 4 
presents our results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The Game 
Our game shares certain features with the decision setup developed by Milinski et al. (2008) 
and extended by Tavoni et al. (2011). At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were 
endowed with €40 and randomly assigned to groups of 6 anonymous players. The groups 
remained unchanged throughout the session. The experiment was composed of 10 rounds. In 
each round, players decided how much of their private endowment to contribute to a common 
account between €0, €2, and €4. Players knew that if the group contribution at the end of the 
10 rounds failed to reach or exceed some threshold, each player would lose 90% of her 
remaining endowment. This means that failing to reach the threshold would leave players 
with only 10% of their private savings as opposed to 100%. After each round players were 
informed about the contributions of all individuals and of the group, both in the current round 
and cumulated. At round 1 and round 6, players could make non-binding proposals to the 
group regarding the collective contribution to reach, which were also notified to the group. 
Subjects in our experiment were randomly assigned to one of five different treatments. In a 
control treatment (“Baseline”) the contribution threshold was certain. Players knew that if the 
group failed to contribute €120 or more after 10 rounds, all members would be paid only 10% 
of their remaining private endowments. In the treatments with uncertainty, in contrast, players 
did not know in advance the threshold that had to be reached in order to prevent the public 
bad, i.e. to keep their private savings. Specifically, the players were confronted ex-ante with 
several potential thresholds; each of them could become the ex-post threshold with a certain 
probability. Unlike previous experiments on threshold uncertainty, we kept the threshold 
interval constant across treatments. In particular, the discrete threshold probability functions 
were described over 13 potential thresholds ranging from €0 to €240 in €20 increments. Note 
that the [€0, €240] interval implied both that the public bad might be avoided with zero 
contributions and that the public bad might occur even if all six players contribute their entire 
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€40 endowment (thus becoming indifferent to the occurrence of the public bad). At the end of 
the experiment, the threshold was determined through a ball picking task: A participant 
volunteered to publicly pick one small plastic ball out of many, which determined the 
threshold value. Subjects were paid either 100% or 10% of their remaining endowments, 
depending on whether their group had reached the threshold contribution or not.  
We implemented four treatments with threshold uncertainty. Figure 1 illustrates the frequency 
distribution of the balls. There were two treatments involving risk, which had the same 
expected value of the threshold (€120) but different probability distributions. One treatment 
(“Triangular”) involved a symmetric triangle-shaped probability density function clustered 
around the single mode of €120. The other treatment involving risk (“Uniform”) was based on 
a flat uniform distribution, meaning that all potential threshold values were equally likely.  
We also implemented two treatments in which subjects faced ambiguity. That is, not only 
players could not know the threshold with certainty, they were also ignorant about the 
probability distribution of the threshold. Such treatments were seemingly related to the risk 
treatments in that we added additional “noise”. However, we also wanted to vary how 
confident people would likely feel about the ultimate probability distribution of the threshold, 
arguably capturing different “levels of ambiguity”. In one such treatment (“AmbTriangular”), 
the 12 subjects who entered the lab were asked to choose one out of 13 colors on a paper 
sheet. Knowing that all individuals had made this decision (but not knowing the others’ 
decisions), subjects were subsequently informed that each choice identified the color of an 
additional ball to be added to a triangle-shaped frequency of balls similar to the one in the 
Triangular treatment (see Figure 1). In the second ambiguity treatment (“AmbUniform”), one 
randomly selected subject was asked to go into another room in order to complete a brief task 
and wait until the end of the session. The task was to distribute 50 balls over a blank matrix 
on a paper sheet (without knowing the purpose). The student was explicitly informed that he 
or she had complete freedom of choice and that the balls could be distributed in any way, e.g. 
symmetric or asymmetric. The resulting distribution determined the probability distribution of 
the threshold. The remaining participants were informed about this procedure and thus played 
the game without knowing the threshold probability distribution. 
Table I summarizes the experimental design. Note that there was no information asymmetry 
between experimenters and subjects, meaning that the former were also ignorant about the 
probability distribution determined via the tasks. This is an important feature of our design for 
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two different reasons. First, decision makers perceive ambiguity differently when there is 
somebody else (e.g. the experimenter) who has more information or not (Chow and Sarin 
2002). Second, the environmental uncertainty that revolves around tipping points is typically 
one of the “unknowable” type, as nobody has nor could have more information than decision 
makers. Validity concerns thus imposed to implement a procedure in which subjects and 
experimenters had the same information regarding the threshold distribution. 
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab at the University of Magdeburg, Germany. 
In total, 300 subjects participated in the experiment, recruited from the general student 
population (recruitment software ORSEE, Greiner 2004). Subjects earned €13.08 on average 
including a show-up fee of €2.00. Sixty subjects participated in each treatment. Subjects in 
each experimental session were assigned to the same treatment. Each subject was seated at 
linked computer terminals that were used to transmit all decisions and payoff information 
(game software Z-tree, Fischbacher 2007). Once subjects were seated, a set of written 
instructions was handed out. Experimental instructions (see Appendix) included numerical 
examples and control questions in order to ensure that subjects understood the game. An oral 
presentation highlighted the key features of the game and provided further numerical 
examples before the game started. After the final round, subjects completed a short 
questionnaire that elicited, among other things, their motivation during the game (see Table 
SIII in the Appendix).  
 
3 The Equilibria 
The game can be analyzed in the framework of expected payoff maximization, as follows. All 
players {1,..., }N n  have symmetrical strategy sets iC  and make simultaneous contribution 
choices in each round belonging to {1,..., }R r . The contribution threshold T needed to 
provide the public good (after the final round has been played and r successive contributions 
t
ic  have been made in each round t R  by the n players, yielding 1 1
r n t
jt j
I c    ), comes 
from a cumulative distribution function ( )IF T . Given a profile c  of contributions in the entire 
game, player i’s expected payoff is 
1 1
( ) ( )( ) (1 ( ))( )r rt ti I i I it tc F T w c F T w c d        , 
where w  is players’ endowment and d  is the percentage of private moneys that a player 
keeps if the threshold is not reached. 
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In the game, we tested 6n  , {0,2,4}iC   in each round ( 10)r  , 40w   and 10%d  . 
Whereas in Baseline 120T   with certainty, in Triangular and Uniform T  is a discrete 
random variable with ( ) 120E T   and increasing dispersion around the first moment.2 
Recalling that, with the exception of Baseline, the requirement to provide the public good is 
no longer to reach a fixed sum of €120 but rather to tackle a probabilistic threshold given 
different sets of information, one can reason in terms of the investment *I  that maximizes the 
group’s expected payoff. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the provision probability 
for each threshold in Baseline, Triangular and Uniform.  
A salient feature of our game is that the value of the public good decreases with contributions. 
When players have already contributed a substantial share of their endowments, the public 
good is of low value because the players have little left in their private accounts, and thus 
little to lose. Therefore, the right tail of the distribution does not matter as much as the left 
tail, where players have much to lose. This is why Uniform is characterized by lower optimal 
contributions * 100I   than the other treatments as highlighted in Figure 3 and Table II. 
Consider first the two risk treatments with uncertain threshold but known probability (center 
and right panels in Figure 3). When the group collectively increases contributions I  to target 
a higher threshold, the benefits from the investment increase, as the likelihood that the ex-post 
drawn threshold is reached (T I ) increases. However, also the ensuing costs increase, more 
steeply on the right side of the figures. The leftmost panel in Figure 3 concerns the Baseline 
treatment. In it, because of the certainty of the threshold ( 120T  ), group benefits sharply 
jump from €24 when the threshold is not reached (given the 90% loss) to €240 when it is 
reached. Again, investments are initially relatively less costly (angular coefficient = 0.1), and 
become steeper from 120I   onwards (angular coefficient = 1).  
Comparing the expected costs and benefits in Figure 3, it becomes apparent that the 
coordination challenge becomes harder with increasing dispersion around the mean, i.e. from 
Baseline to Triangular to Uniform. First of all, while in Baseline there are only two pure 
strategy Nash equilibria around which groups can coordinate ( 0I   and 120I  , with the 
                                                            
2 Note that, while in Baseline ( ) 0IF T  , if 120I   and ( ) 1IF T  , if 120I  , in the risk treatments 
( ) 0IF T   for each investment level (i.e. there is a positive provision probability even for 0I  ). On the 
other end of the spectrum, only 240I   guarantees provision in the Triangular and Uniform, which would 
leave each player with 
1
0r titw c  . The coordination problem is therefore more complex in the risk 
treatments. 
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latter payoff-dominating the former), there are many under threshold uncertainty. The 120I   
contribution level is somewhat less focal in the risk treatments, since it is no longer the case 
that any contributions below or above €120 are wasted. In particular, each of the seven 
thresholds between 0 and 120 inclusive are Nash equilibria.3 The zero contribution strategy 
0I   is again a payoff-dominated Nash equilibrium, since unilateral deviations lower a 
player’s expected payoff. Moreover, the expected payoff does not change as abruptly when 
moving from one value of I  to another one in Triangular and Uniform (i.e. the net benefits of 
choosing 120I   over 0I   or any other value of I  are less marked than in Baseline). 
Lastly, the maximum group payoff (which is given by the vertical distance between the 
benefits and costs curves) drops from €120 in Baseline to €74 in Triangular, both achieved at 
* 120I   (implying a probability of provision of 1 and 0.57, respectively). In Uniform, the 
maximum expected payoff is €72, when * 100I   and the probability of provision is 0.46.   
Table II reports the expected payoffs from following a pure symmetric strategy as well as 
from following the optimal symmetric contribution, i.e. the one leading the group to reach  
*I . In sum, we have established that groups are best off with positive contributions of either 
€2/round, or slightly less in Uniform. (But note that the expected payoff from contributing 
€2/round, €11.7, is close to the maximal attainable value €12.0). These provision levels that 
maximize the (expected) joint payoff are supportable as Nash equilibria in all treatments. 
However, there also exist other payoff-dominated equilibria; hence an equilibrium selection 
problem exists.4 Therefore, rather than testing precise theoretical hypotheses, the purpose of 
our experiment is more explorative and empirical: Can subjects reach the 'best' equilibrium 
when there are many (i.e. reach a target when it is uncertain)? We resort to the empirics to 
answer this question. In a similar fashion, we discover if groups are able to reach a high 
public good provision level when they face ambiguity. Expected utility theory cannot be of 
much guidance in the ambiguity treatments since the experimenter is unaware of the subjects’ 
prior. However, the €120 threshold arguably is a natural focal point in all treatments. It is not 
only the certain threshold in the Baseline treatment and the expected value of the threshold in 
the two risk treatments, but it is also the midpoint of the [0, 240] interval and the collective 
outcome if all the players choose the intermediate €2/round strategy. 
                                                            
3 Moreover, in Triangular, provided that in the first nine rounds investments have amassed to €128, C = 2 is the 
dominant strategy in round 10. So 140 may be also a Nash equilibrium under these conditions. This is not the 
case in Uniform, as exemplified in Table SI and Table SII in the Appendix. 
4 Note that this characteristic is due to the discrete nature of our probability distribution of the threshold (see 
Barrett 2011b for the effects of a continuous distribution). 
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4 Results 
Table III presents the summary statistics of the experimental data averaged across groups per 
treatment. The contributions to the public good decreased from the certainty (Baseline) to risk 
(Triangular, Uniform) and from risk to ambiguity (AmbTriangular, AmbUniform). A series of 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirms that subjects in Baseline contributed significantly more 
than those in the other treatments (p<0.01 for each treatment, see Table IV).5 Thus, threshold 
uncertainty hampered cooperative efforts in our game. 
The average proposals for the group target, shown in the first and second column of Table III, 
were close to €120 and do not significantly differ between treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test p>0.1 for each treatment and both proposals). In all treatments except for Baseline, that is 
whenever uncertainty was involved, contributions were markedly lower than proposals. That 
is, when facing uncertainty, subjects contributed significantly less than what they had 
proposed before (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test p<0.01 for each treatment and both proposals). 
This may suggest that although players had a similar approach to the game, uncertainty 
ultimately affected their behavioral responses.  
The experiment was designed in order to examine the effects of uncertainty on subjects’ 
ability to avoid a collective damage. However, the groups’ actual effectiveness in avoiding 
the damage depended on the random draw in the experimental sessions. A group that was 
successful in its own session might have been unsuccessful in another session, and vice versa. 
In order to elaborate on groups’ comparative performance, Table V shows the percentages of 
groups that would have succeeded in avoiding the damage at different hypothetical thresholds 
given their contributed amounts in the experiment. The results indicate that all groups would 
have succeeded at a threshold of €20 and none would have succeeded at €160. Between these 
two values there are remarkable treatment differences. Consider the focal €120 threshold. In 
Baseline, all groups reached the threshold successfully, with 7/10 groups contributing exactly 
€120. In the risk treatments, Triangular and Uniform, 2/10 groups would have succeeded at a 
threshold of €120. In AmbTriangular 1/10 group would have succeeded while no group would 
have reached this threshold in AmbUniform. Compared to the 100% success rate in Baseline, 
                                                            
5 Statistical tests are based on group averages as units of observation. If not stated otherwise, the reported tests 
are two-sided throughout the paper. Note also, that the differences between Baseline and the other treatments are 
always significant at any conventional significance level and robust to multiple comparison corrections. 
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these differences in percentages of successful groups are highly significant (one-sided 
Fisher’s exact probability test p<0.01 for each treatment). Furthermore, the groups in the risk 
treatments were (at least in expected terms) more successful than those in the ambiguity 
treatments. 
The coordination of contributions towards a certain threshold obviously was not too difficult. 
In fact, all groups under certainty reached the threshold and many of them exactly met it. 
Notably, the variance of the group contributions increased significantly from certainty to risk 
and ambiguity, as the group performance varied widely under uncertainty (see Tables III and 
4). What did determine the group performance in these treatments? Let us first consider the 
players’ proposals for the group target. Table III shows that under uncertainty the average 
contributions always fell short of the average proposals. Only 1/40 group (in the 
AmbTriangular treatment) managed to collect the amount proposed by the group members 
prior to the game. Still, proposals might have helped the subjects to coordinate their efforts 
insofar as higher proposals might have led to higher contributions even if the latter did not 
reach the former. Figure 4 shows the correlation between the average proposal and the 
group’s total investment. It indicates that the correlation depends on the treatment. While the 
gap between proposals and actual investment was generally small in the two risk treatments, it 
was larger in the two ambiguity treatments, especially when looking at the first proposal. A 
series of Pearson correlation tests confirms an at least weakly significant positive correlation 
between the average first proposal by a group and its investment for Triangular (ρ=0.88, 
p=0.001) and Uniform (ρ=0.58, p=0.076) but reveals no significant correlation for 
AmbTriangular (ρ=-0.07, p=0.843) and AmbUniform (ρ=0.24, p=0.510).6 The same is true for 
individual proposals. The individual first proposals and individual contributions to the public 
good are significantly correlated in Triangular (ρ=0.55, p=0.000) and weakly significantly 
correlated in Uniform (ρ=0.25, p=0.057), while there is no significant correlation in 
AmbTriangular (ρ=0.02, p=0.906) and AmbUniform (ρ=0.13, p=0.322). A direct comparison 
between treatments by a test of equal correlations indicates significant differences between 
Triangular and AmbTriangular (group level: p=0.011, individual level: p=0.001) and between 
Triangular and AmbUniform (group level: p=  0.036, individual level: p=0.009). Figure 4 
shows furthermore that the gap between the average proposal and actual contributions became 
                                                            
6 All the results on the correlation between variables do also hold if we employ the Spearman’s rank correlation 
test. 
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smaller for the second proposal, indicating that the subjects adjusted their proposals 
downwards to what proved to be feasible after the first half of the game. 
If subjects ex-ante made similar contribution plans across treatments, why did they actually 
invest less when faced with uncertainty? To answer this question we consider the first round 
of the game. This round shows players’ decision without any feedback about their co-players’ 
actions, and therefore is informative regarding players’ unconditional willingness to 
contribute. Figure 5 shows the correlation between early action, defined here as the average 
group contribution undertaken in the first round, and the contributions provided in all the 
subsequent rounds. The correlation depends, again, on the treatment. While there is no 
significant correlation in Triangular (ρ=0.21, p=0.552), early action and subsequent 
contributions are positively and significantly correlated in Uniform (ρ=0.72, p=0.019), 
AmbTriangular (ρ=0.69, p=0.026), and AmbUniform (ρ=0.78, p=0.008).7 Thus, when players 
were confronted with a high degree of uncertainty, they reacted very sensitively to their co-
players’ behavior at the beginning of the game. 
This observation leads to the next salient question: How likely was a low first round 
investment in the different treatments? The average group contribution in the first round is 
€11.8 in Baseline, €11.6 in Triangular, €11.6 in Uniform, €9.8 in AmbTriangular, and €10.6 
in AmbUniform. Thus, the groups faced with ambiguity started the game with slightly lower 
contributions than the groups under certainty or risk. The combination of little early action 
and players’ sensitivity to the first round behavior explains the poor performance of some 
groups in these treatments. To illustrate this, consider the group that provided the smallest 
amount (€26) of all groups taking part in the AmbUniform treatment (and of all groups taking 
part in the experiment). This group started in the first round with only €6 allocated to the 
public good. In contrast, the group with largest investment after ten rounds in AmbUniform 
(€118) provided €14 in the first round. Put differently, the difference in contributions between 
these two groups increased in the course of the game from €8 in the first round to €92 in the 
last round. In the AmbTriangular treatment, the group with the lowest overall investment 
(€36) provided only €6 in the first round, while the one with highest overall investment 
(€120) contributed €12 in the first round. Thus, the difference between these two groups 
increased from €6 at the beginning to €84 at the end of the game. On the other hand, the 
                                                            
7 In the Baseline treatment, the correlation between early action and subsequent contributions is also highly 
significant but negative (ρ=-0.84, p=0.002), reflecting the presence of groups that had a slow start but ultimately 
strived and managed to reach the threshold. 
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Uniform treatment, characterized by a similar relevance of the first round but higher overall 
investment, owed much of it to many groups starting the game with relatively high 
contributions (see Figure S1 in the Appendix).  
The minimum first round contribution across all groups taking part in the experiment was €6, 
the maximum was €14. Although the difference is substantial for a single round, the groups 
with a low first round contribution could have easily made up for that during the nine 
remaining rounds. Still, this did not happen. Most groups taking early action, as defined in 
Figure S1 by investing at least €12 in the first round, did so because all of their members 
invested at least €2. About one-third of these groups (11/31) contained exactly one free-rider 
who gave nothing and was compensated by the co-players’ contributions. None of these 
groups contained more than one free-rider. Thus, most of these groups started the game with a 
high contribution level and with an equally shared burden. The latter, in particular, might have 
helped to keep the group’s motivation up for the remaining rounds. To test this hypothesis we 
calculate the normalized Gini coefficient for the first round as well as the average normalized 
Gini coefficient across all rounds.8 Both coefficients are positively correlated (ρ=0.64, 
p=0.000), indicating that an equal burden sharing in the first round was likely to be followed 
by an overall equal burden sharing. The average normalized Gini coefficient across all rounds 
is 0.09 for Baseline, 0.16 for Triangular, 0.18 for Uniform, and 0.22 for both ambiguity 
treatments. That is, inequality within groups tended to be higher under uncertainty. Figure 6 
presents the correlation between inequality, i.e. the average normalized Gini coefficient across 
all rounds, and total investment. As could be expected from the above discussion, the 
correlation depends on the treatment. It is negative and highly significant in Uniform (ρ=-
0.94, p=0.000), AmbTriangular (ρ=-0.93, p=0.000), and AmbUniform (ρ=-0.87, p=0.001) 
while it is not significant in Baseline (ρ=0.03, p=0.945) and Triangular (ρ=-0.44, p=0.206). 
The direct comparison between treatments reveals that the differences in correlations between 
Baseline and Triangular, on the one hand, and Uniform, AmbTriangular, and AmbUniform, 
on the other, are at least weakly significant (p<0.1 each). 
                                                            
8 The average Gini coefficient was calculated as follows:  
1 1
1 1
2 ( 1)
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 
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   
where k is the rank of individual contributions within a group, when contributions are considered in an ascending 
order. 
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Table VI presents a series of linear regressions of the cumulative group investment.9 Columns 
1 and 2 capture the investment over the entire game, while Columns 3 and 4 capture the 
rounds 2-10 only, because these models include the first round investment as regressor. 
Columns 2 and 4 exclude the Baseline treatment in order to highlight the effects of the 
independent variables under uncertainty. All independent variables as well as the dependent 
variable are defined at group level. The results qualify the relationship we have identified 
between uncertainty and group investment. The groups in Baseline contributed more to the 
public good than those in all the other treatments, and the difference is highly significant 
between Baseline and Uniform and between Baseline and the two ambiguity treatments. The 
groups in Triangular contributed more than those in the ambiguity treatments.  
In addition, contributions were significantly larger when the groups had made a larger second 
proposal. This effect is not observed for the average first proposal, which confirms that this 
proposal did not serve as a good signal for the group performance. The two regression models 
including the first round investment as regressor confirm that a high first round investment 
was only important for the groups facing uncertainty. Another interesting question is whether 
fairness considerations affected the group performance. 37% of the players reported in the 
questionnaire that fairness did not play a role in their investment decision. For the other 
players, the impact of fairness was either positive or negative; players either increased their 
contributions when they had observed a high investment level within their group (6%) or, 
more likely, they decreased their contributions when they had observed a low investment 
level (31%) (see Table SIII in the Appendix). In line with these statements, the regression 
analysis shows that the group performance suffered from a high number of members reporting 
negative impacts of fairness. These findings indicate that an unequal burden sharing really 
lowered players’ willingness to cooperate.  
Table SIV in the Appendix presents the results from a series of linear regressions of the 
cumulative individual contributions to the public good. The regression results basically 
confirm all key findings. 
 
                                                            
9 The regression models include the questions about the players’ motivation for their proposal for the group 
target, the motivation for their investment decisions, and the question about fairness consideration (see Table 
SIII in the Appendix). All other variables taken from the questionnaire, for example risk aversion, trust, and 
analytical skills, have been excluded because the pre-regression analysis has shown that these characteristics did 
not significantly affect players’ behavior. 
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5 Conclusions 
Science tells us that the climate system and other natural resources involve tipping points, 
beyond which potentially catastrophic and irreversible consequences to our planet may ensue. 
However, these tipping points and the efforts required to avoid triggering them are highly 
uncertain. Although there is widespread political consensus about the need to avoid passing 
such thresholds, countries’ willingness to contribute to this collective goal may be seriously 
affected by environmental uncertainty. We designed an experiment involving a threshold 
public goods game to compare how collective action is affected by whether the threshold is 
known or not. The challenge of the game is always one of coordinating public good 
contributions because the provision level that maximizes the expected joint payoff is 
supportable as Nash equilibrium. The consequences of not reaching some threshold 
contribution reduce the incentive to deviate unilaterally, i.e. to free-ride on others’ efforts. 
Coordination is harder under uncertainty because the number of equilibria is higher than 
under certainty and they are often close to each other in terms of expected payoffs. Hence, the 
disincentive to free-ride is smaller under uncertainty. Our experiment is arguably special in so 
far as it does not test a precise theory but rather whether groups are able to reach the payoff-
dominant equilibrium when they are many. Furthermore, unlike previous experimental 
studies, we increased uncertainty by adding some additional noise to the probability 
distribution that complicated players’ expectations formation. 
The experimental results show that threshold uncertainty negatively affected the provision of 
the public good. Whereas all our experimental groups succeeded in preventing the public bad 
when the threshold was known, this result was not replicated in presence of threshold 
uncertainty. Contributions were generally lower when players did not know the threshold 
precisely. Moreover, contributions were particularly low and erratic when players faced 
ambiguity.  
The players’ proposals for the targeted collective contribution indicate that ex-ante the players 
made similar plans in all treatments. However, in the presence of uncertainty (and in 
particular of ambiguity), contributions were markedly lower than proposals, arguably because 
players were more sensitive to others’ behavior. This sensitivity did not matter so much when 
players got off on a good start of the game. However, there was also a tendency among 
players facing ambiguity to start the game “carefully” with relatively low first round 
contributions. The combination of both, the sensitivity and the slow start, eventually led to a 
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very poor performance of some groups in these treatments. On the other hand, when a group 
happened to start the game with high and equally distributed first round contributions, it was 
likely to reach an overall high contribution level and to ultimately avert the collective damage. 
As a consequence the group performance varied widely under uncertainty. The key result of 
our experiment therefore is that early action and fairness become very important in the 
presence of uncertainty.  
The finding that people who do not know the target with precision rely on other people in 
their peer group for guidance may help to explain the prominent role of equity and fairness in 
international agreements, such as climate agreements (Lange et al. 2007). However, unlike in 
our game, the fair distribution of efforts is not obvious as countries do not only differ in their 
contributions to global public goods but also in many other aspects. In addition to this 
comparability problem, countries’ fairness perceptions are often subject to a self-serving bias 
so that they prefer the fairness principle that would generate least costs for them (Lange et al. 
2010). Therefore, if a fair distribution is decisive for success but at the same time difficult to 
implement, a practical implication may be to reframe the negotiations in a way that makes the 
comparison easier (Barrett 2011a). 
Another key result of the experiment is the 100% success rate under certainty and its 
robustness with respect to the distribution of efforts among players and over time. It suggests 
that, if the natural tipping points were known with precision and the consequences of 
triggering them were truly catastrophic, countries could be expected to tackle the problem. 
The large uncertainty involved in many natural systems, however, may worsen the chances 
considerably. Therefore our results accentuate the need for research to reduce environmental 
uncertainty. 
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Table I: Experimental design 
Treatment Uncertainty Interval Threshold Probability No. of subjects 
Baseline None [€0, €240] T=120 Known (=1) 60 
Triangular Risk [€0, €240] E(T)=120 Known 60 
Uniform Risk [€0, €240] E(T)=120 Known 60 
AmbTriangular Ambiguity [€0, €240]  Unknown 60 
AmbUniform Ambiguity [€0, €240]  Unknown 60 
  
 
Table II: Expected payoffs 
Treatment π(0)  (I=0) 
π(20)  
(I=120) 
π(40)  
(I=240) c* π(c*) I* 
Baseline 4.0 20.0 0 20 20.0 120 
Triangular 4.7 12.3 0 20 12.3 120 
Uniform 6.8 11.7 0 17 12.0 100 
Note: Player’s expected payoffs from following a symmetric strategy and from the collectively 
optimal cumulative investment c*. If all players contribute an equal share of the burden (c=20), 
this corresponds to an expected payoff of €20 in Baseline and €12.3 in Triangular. In Uniform, 
players are best off when each provides about €17, which is not possible given that in each round 
the strategy set is C={0, 2, 4}. Of course players could still coordinate on I*=100, but that 
necessarily requires asymmetric contributions. 
 
 
Table III: Summary statistics 
Treatment First proposal 
Second 
proposal 
Group 
contribution 
Min / max group 
contribution 
Baseline 121.8 (9.1) 
121.9 
(4.4) 
121.2 
(2.1) 120 / 126 
Triangular 120.4 (19.4) 
122.9 
(19.8) 
99.4 
(20.4) 78 /140 
Uniform 124.1 (10.6) 
123.2 
(12.4) 
101.4 
(19.5) 58 / 122 
AmbTriangular 127.0 (7.5) 
120.3 
(9.8) 
84.0 
(24.6) 36 /120 
AmbUniform 122.9 (12.8) 
115.2 
(16.8) 
83.0 
(30.7) 26 / 118 
Note: Average values by treatment; standard deviations in parentheses; last column 
shows the minimum and maximum group contributions.  
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Table IV: Significance of treatment differences 
Triangular 0.0043 (0.0004)    
Uniform 0.0023 (0.0026) 
0.4717 
(0.7305)   
AmbTriangular 0.0003 (0.0041) 
0.1032 
(0.8030) 
0.0819 
(0.6027)  
AmbUniform 0.0001 (0.0000) 
0.2727 
(0.1162) 
0.1854 
(0.0742) 
0.8501 
(0.2596) 
 Baseline Triangular Uniform AmbTriangular 
Note: p-values from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of treatment differences in 
average contributions; in parentheses p-values from a Levene test of 
treatment differences in variances. 
 
 
Table V: Success rate at given hypothetical thresholds 
Threshold Baseline Triangular Uniform AmbTriangular AmbUniform 
20  100% 100% 100% 100% 
40  100% 100% 90% 90% 
60  100% 90% 90% 80% 
80  90% 90% 50% 60% 
100  40% 60% 20% 40% 
120 100% 20% 20% 10% 0% 
140  10% 0% 0% 0% 
160  0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note: Percentage of groups which would have reached hypothetical thresholds given the actual amounts 
contributed in the game. 
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Table VI: Linear regression of group investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Rd.1-10 Rd.1-10 Rd.2-10 Rd.2-10 
Treatment dummies 
(Reference: Baseline or Triangular) 
    
Triangular -9.158  -6.665  
 (6.695)  (6.496)  
Uniform -16.39*** -6.943 -13.14** -6.499 
 (4.821) (5.638) (5.140) (4.663) 
AmbTriangular -21.19*** -11.38** -15.22** -6.948 
 (7.250) (5.517) (6.702) (4.262) 
AmbUniform -24.22*** -13.38** -19.06*** -10.21* 
 (6.196) (5.788) (6.470) (5.403) 
     
Average 1st proposal 0.0848 0.0665 0.120 0.268 
 (0.176) (0.234) (0.171) (0.207) 
Average 2nd proposal 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.637*** 0.466** 
 (0.198) (0.230) (0.163) (0.192) 
Group investment rd.1   1.160 2.127** 
   (0.839) (0.939) 
Motivation investment  
(no. of group members, reference: risk assessment) 
    
Own proposal 4.075*** 4.968** 2.712* 2.933 
 (1.366) (2.100) (1.397) (2.087) 
Average proposal 8.968*** 9.082*** 6.293*** 5.759*** 
 (2.025) (2.192) (1.953) (1.894) 
Safety 2.771 4.598 3.040 7.109** 
 (1.908) (3.229) (1.958) (3.436) 
Fairness 
(no. of group members, reference: no fairness) 
    
Positive -0.112 0.619 0.111 1.719 
 (1.365) (1.976) (1.192) (1.706) 
Negative -5.270** -5.122* -5.532*** -5.249** 
 (2.368) (2.571) (2.009) (2.181) 
     
Constant -1.499 -12.76 -12.02 -31.74 
 (21.10) (25.26) (19.61) (25.21) 
No. of observations  50 40 50 40 
R2 0.856 0.825 0.862 0.846 
Linear regression of group investment in rd.1-10 (Columns 1 and 2) and in rd.2-10 (Columns 3 and 4);
Columns 2 and 4 exclude the Baseline treatment; robust standard errors in parentheses; significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Figure 1: The distribution of balls used to determine the threshold 
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Figure 2: The provision probability for each threshold
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Costs and benefits from contributing to the public good  
(the black line indicates the maximum expected payoff achievable by a group) 
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Appendix 
Supporting Theoretical Analyses 
Table SI: Example I 
Round P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  
1 2 2 2 2 2 2  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
3 2 2 2 2 2 2  
4 2 2 2 2 2 2  
5 2 2 2 2 2 2  
6 2 2 2 2 2 2  
7 2 2 2 2 2 2  
8 2 2 2 2 2 2  
9 2 2 2 2 2 2 sum=108 
10 2 2 2 2 2 2 sum=120 
Note: An hypothetical example of symmetrical play of the C = 2 strategy 
in Uniform; I=120 is a Nash equilibrium, as switching to C = 0 in the last 
round diminishes the expected value. 
 
Table SII: Example II 
Round P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  
1 4 4 4 4 4 4  
2 4 4 4 4 2 2  
3 2 2 2 2 2 2  
4 2 2 2 2 2 2  
5 2 2 2 2 2 2  
6 2 2 2 2 2 2  
7 2 2 2 2 2 2  
8 2 2 2 2 2 2  
9 2 2 2 2 2 2 sum=128 
10 2 2 2 2 2 2 sum=140 
Note: An hypothetical example showing that I=140 is not supportable as 
a Nash equilibrium in Uniform; switching to C = 0 in the last round is a 
profitable deviation. 
 
Tables SI and SII present hypothetical examples for the Uniform treatment. The example in 
Table SI shows that, given the symmetric intermediate-contribution strategies followed by all 
players in rounds 1-9, no one has an incentive to deviate in the final round. By sticking to 
2C  , players expect €11.7  , while if a single player switches to 0C  , the expected 
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payoff from 100T   is €11.3.10 Having established that 120T   is (under reasonable 
symmetrical contributions conditions) preferred to 100T  , we show in Table SII that 
140T   is not preferred to 120T  . Assume that players 1-4 have each invested €22 in the 
first 9 rounds, while players 5-6 have each invested €20. This means they have collectively 
contributed €128 to the climate account, before the last round begins: are they better off by all 
choosing 2C   in round 10 and reaching 140T  ? Players 5 and 6 would, as the ensuing 
expected pay is €11.8, while switching to C = 0  implies an expected pay of €11.7. However, 
this is not a Nash equilibrium, as players 1-4 are (marginally) better off when switching from 
C = 2 to C = 0 ሺ€10.46	൏	€10.52ሻ. 
                                                            
10 Note that, should a player (irrationally) deviate in round 10 and choose 0C  , the remaining players would 
be best-off by following suit, as ߨሺ22ሻൌ€10.5൏ߨሺ18ሻൌ€11.3. That is, it is not advantageous for other players 
to compensate the free-rider, so 120T   will not be provided. Put differently, the set of strategies requiring all 
an investment of €2/round is a Nash equilibrium, but is not evolutionarily stable. By contrast, 0I   (which 
doesn’t require coordination) is always stable, so a deviating player will find it optimal to revert back to 0C   
in successive rounds.    
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Supporting Empirical Analyses 
Table SIII: Ex-post questionnaire and responses 
Question Answer No. % 
(1) What was the motivation for your first proposal for 
the group target? Please tick one answer. 
Safety 
Risk assessment 
Strategic considerations 
Other 
81 
140 
58 
21 
27.00 
46.67 
19.33 
7.00 
(2) What was the motivation for your second proposal for 
the group target? Please tick one answer. 
Safety 
Risk assessment 
Strategic considerations 
Other 
64 
127 
82 
27 
21.33 
42.33 
27.33 
9.00 
(3) Please recall your investment decisions during the 
game. What was the motivation for your investment? 
Please tick one answer. 
Own proposal for group target 
Average proposal for group target 
Safety 
Risk assessment 
Other 
86 
68 
28 
79 
39 
28.67 
22.67 
9.33 
26.33 
13.00 
(4) Did fairness play a role in your investment decisions 
and if so, in which respect? Please tick one answer. 
 
Fairness did not play a role 
I invested more than initially 
planned because my co-players 
invested a lot 
I invested less than initially planned 
because my co-players invested 
little 
Other fairness consideration 
112 
17 
 
 
92 
 
 
79 
37.33 
5.67 
 
 
30.67 
 
 
26.33 
(5) How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person 
who is fully prepared to take risk or do you try to avoid 
taking risk? Please tick a box on the scale, where the 
value 1 means: "fully prepared to take risk" and the value 
6 means: "risk averse". You can use the values in 
between to make your estimate. 
1 (fully prepared to take risk) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 (risk averse) 
2 
32 
111 
109 
43 
3 
0.67 
10.67 
37.00 
36.33 
14.33 
1 
 
(6) How good are you at working with fractions (e.g. 
“one fifth of something”) or percentages (e.g. “20% of 
something”)? Please tick a box on the scale, where the 
value 1 means: "not good at all" and the value 6 means: 
"extremely good". You can use the values in between to 
make your estimate. 
1 (not good at all) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 (extremely good) 
1 
10 
21 
50 
123 
95 
0.33 
3.33 
7.00 
16.67 
41.00 
31.67 
(7) Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people? Please tick a box on the scale, 
where the value 1 means: "most people can be trusted" 
and the value 6 means: "need to be very careful". You 
can use the values in between to make your estimate. 
1 (most people can be trusted) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 (need to be very careful) 
4 
28 
86 
94 
63 
25 
1.33 
9.33 
28.67 
31.33 
21.00 
8.33 
(8) Do you trust your fellow students completely, 
somewhat, not very much or not at all? Please tick one 
answer. 
 
Completely 
Somewhat 
Not very much 
Not at all 
27 
202 
63 
8 
9.00 
67.33 
21.00 
2.67 
 ∑ 300 100.00 
  
Table SIII presents the questions and responses from the ex-post questionnaire. It reveals that 
risk assessment was an important motivation for most players’ proposal for the group target, 
while the motivation for the investment was more evenly distributed across different 
possibilities. For the majority of players fairness either did not play a role in their contribution 
30 
 
decision or affected contributions negatively.  
Table SIV: Linear regression of individual investment 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Rd.1-10 Rd.1-10 
Treatment dummies 
(Reference: Baseline or Triangular) 
  
Triangular -2.256***  
 (0.662)  
Uniform -2.032*** 0.226 
 (0.627) (0.667) 
AmbTriangular -3.777*** -1.400 
 (0.953) (0.840) 
AmbUniform -3.672*** -1.306 
 (0.926) (0.874) 
   
1st proposal 0.00904 0.0221 
 (0.0138) (0.0135) 
2nd proposal 0.0760*** 0.0627*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0146) 
Others average rd.1 1.842** 2.228** 
 (0.800) (0.829) 
Motivation 1st proposal  
(Reference: risk assessment) 
  
Safety 1.005* 1.406** 
 (0.511) (0.682) 
Strategic -1.726** -1.964** 
 (0.722) (0.851) 
Motivation investment 
(Reference: risk assessment) 
  
Own proposal 3.974*** 4.449*** 
 (0.599) (0.649) 
Average proposal 3.848*** 4.279*** 
 (0.724) (0.779) 
Safety 3.590*** 4.898*** 
 (0.838) (1.333) 
Fairness 
(Reference: no fairness) 
  
Positive 2.536*** 3.377*** 
 (0.672) (0.851) 
Negative -0.0622 0.0316 
 (0.753) (0.815) 
   
Constant 1.887 -1.736 
 (2.309) (2.315) 
No. of observations  300 240 
R2 0.506 0.507 
Linear regression of individual investment in rd.1-10; Column (2) excludes the
Baseline treatment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group
level); significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table SIV presents the results from a series of linear regressions of the cumulative individual 
contributions to the public good. Overall, the regression results confirm the key findings 
presented in the paper. First of all, the results confirm that uncertainty was detrimental for the 
willingness to cooperate. The subjects in Baseline contributed significantly more than the 
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subjects in all the other treatments. The results confirm furthermore that a high first round 
contribution of the other fellow group members increased the individual investment. This 
effect is larger if the analysis is restricted to the uncertainty treatments. The players who made 
a larger second proposal chose somewhat larger contributions afterwards. This effect is not 
observed for the first proposal. On the other hand, the regression models show that players’ 
motivation for their first proposals played an important role. The subjects who stated safety as 
most important motive for their proposal invested significantly more than those who stated 
risk assessment. The players whose proposals were subject to strategic considerations 
invested less. These differences explain why the first proposals and actual contributions did 
not necessarily go hand in hand. The regressions include also the motivation for the players’ 
investment decisions. The players reporting own proposal, average proposal of the group, or 
safety to be the most important motive invested significantly more than the players whose 
decisions were mostly driven by the weighting of risk. Not surprisingly, the subjects who 
stated that fairness had a positive effect contributed more than the subjects who said that 
fairness had a negative effect and the subjects who decided without considering fairness.  
 
20%
80%
40%
60%
20%
80%
60%
40%
50%50%
38%
62%
Baseline Triangular Uniform
AmbTriangular AmbUniform Total
early action no early action
Early action defined as group investment in the first round being €12 or higher.
Percentage of groups taking early action
Figure S1
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Figure S1 shows the percentage of groups taking early action, defined here as investing at 
least €12 in the first round. Baseline and Uniform are characterized by a high percentage of 
groups taking early action (80% each). Relatively few groups took early action in Triangular 
(60%), AmbTriangular (40%), and AmbUniform (50%). 
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Supporting Material 
Experimental Instructions (Triangular treatment) 
Welcome to our experiment! 
1. General information 
In our experiment, you can earn money. How much you earn depends on the gameplay, or 
more precisely on the decisions you and your fellow players make. Regardless of the 
gameplay, you will receive €2 for your participation. For a successful run of this experiment, 
it is absolutely necessary that you do not talk to other participants or do not communicate in 
any other way. Now read the following rules of the game carefully. If you have any questions, 
please give us a hand signal. It is important that you read up to the STOP sign only. Please 
wait when you get there, as we will give you a brief oral explanation before we continue. 
2. Game rules 
There are six players in the game, meaning you and five other players. Each player is faced 
with the same decision problem. In the beginning of the experiment, you receive a starting 
capital of €40, which is credited to your personal account. During the experiment, you can use 
the money in your account or let it be. In the end, your current account balance is paid to you 
in cash. Your decisions are anonymous. For the purpose of anonymity, you will be allocated a 
pseudonym which will be used for the whole duration of the game. You can see your 
pseudonym in the lower left corner of your display. 
The experiment has exactly ten rounds. In each round, you can invest your money in order to 
try and prevent damage. The damage will have a considerable negative financial impact on all 
players. In each round of the game, all six players are asked the following question at the 
same time: 
“How much do you want to invest to prevent damage?” 
You can answer with €0, €2 or €4. After each player has made her or his decision, the six 
decisions are displayed at the same time. After that, all money paid by the players is booked 
to a special account for damage prevention. 
At the end of the game (after exactly ten rounds), the computer calculates the total 
investments made by all players. If the investments have reached a certain minimum, the 
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damage is prevented. In this case, each player is paid the money remaining in her or his 
account, meaning the €40 starting capital minus the money the player has invested in 
preventing damage over the course of the game. However, if the total investments are lower 
than the minimum, the damage occurs: All players lose 90% of the remaining money in their 
personal accounts. The minimum to be reached in order to prevent damage will be drawn 
randomly. We will draw the minimum after the game in your presence. The draw goes like 
this: The minimum can take the values 0, 20, 40, 60 etc. up to 240 (always in steps of 20). For 
each of these 13 values, a certain number of balls in different colors is put into a bag. One ball 
is drawn from the bag and the value shown on the ball is the minimum value for the game. 
The following figure shows the distribution of the different balls. There are 49 balls 
altogether. These balls are put into a bag, and one is drawn randomly. 
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So the probability of being drawn differs for different values. For example, the probability 
that the minimum takes the value of €60 is 4/49 (  8%). The probability for the value €120 is 
7/49 (  14%). Now, let us assume that a light blue ball with the value 100 was drawn. In this 
case, all players together must have invested at least €100 in order to prevent damage. If a 
single player has invested, say, a total of €10 into damage prevention during the ten rounds, 
she or he has €30 of credit in her or his personal account at the end of the game. If the group 
of players as a whole has invested €100 or more into damage prevention, the damage does not 
occur and this player receives €30 from the game. However, if the group as a whole has 
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invested less than €100, the damage occurs and the player receives €3 (10% of €30) from the 
game.  
Please note the following feature of the game: Before the players decide how much they want 
to invest into preventing damage, they exchange non-binding suggestions for their common 
investment goal. Each player makes a suggestion of how much the group as a whole should 
invest into preventing damage over the total of ten rounds. After that, the suggestions made by 
all players and an average value from all suggestions are shown on the monitor. After round 
5, all players can make a new suggestion for the total investments to be made by the group 
over the ten rounds. After that, the suggestions made by each player and an average value for 
all suggestions are shown on the monitor. 
3. Example 
Here, you can see an example of the decisions made by the six players in one round (round 3). 
  
The right column shows the investments made in the current round (round 3). The players 
Ananke and Kallisto have invested €2 each, the players Telesto and Japetus have invested €4 
each and Despina and Metis have not made any investments. In total, €12 were invested in 
this round. The middle column shows the cumulative investments made by each player from 
the first to the current round (rounds 1-3). The players Ananke and Telesto have each invested 
€6 in the first three rounds. Despina, Kallisto and Metis have each invested €4 and Japetus has 
invested €10 in the first three rounds. In total, €34 were invested in the first three rounds. 
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The left column shows the suggestions made by each player as to how much the group as a 
whole should invest into preventing damage over the ten rounds in total. For example, Metis 
suggests that the group should invest €140. The average of all suggestions is €108. In the 
game, you will see this information after each round. 
“STOP sign” (oral explanation of the game) 
 
4. Control questions 
Please answer the following control questions. 
a. How much does a player have to invest on average over the course of the ten rounds, if 
the group was to invest €60 in total? (please tick the correct answer)  
O €10  O €12  O €20  O €30  O €40  O €120 
b. How much does a player have to invest on average over the course of the ten rounds, if 
the group was to invest €120 in total? (please tick the correct answer)  
O €10  O €12  O €20  O €30  O €40  O €120 
c. How much does a player have to invest on average over the course of the ten rounds, if 
the group was to invest €180 in total? (please tick the correct answer)  
O €10  O €12  O €20  O €30  O €40  O €12 
d. How much does a player have to invest on average over the course of the ten rounds, if 
the group was to invest €240 in total? (please tick the correct answer)  
O €10  O €12  O €20  O €30  O €40  O €120 
e. Assume that the group has invested the minimum to prevent damage, and that you 
have invested €16 in total. How much cash do you get in the end of the game? 
I get €_______. 
f. Take a look at the table in part 3 of the instructions. How much money do Despina and 
Japetus have in their personal accounts after round 3? 
Despina has €_______ in her/his account.   Japetus has €_______ in her/his account. 
g. Assume that you have invested a total of €20 over the ten rounds and the minimum 
investment value was not reached. How much cash do you get at the end of the game?  
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O €0  O €2  O €4  O €6  O €8  O €20 
h. What is the probability of the minimum investment value to prevent damage being 
equal €0? (please tick the correct answer) 
O 0/49 (= 0%)  O 1/49 (≈ 2%)  O 4/49 (≈ 8%)  O 7/49 (≈ 14%) 
i. What is the probability of the minimum investment value to prevent damage being 
equal €240? (please tick the correct answer) 
O 0/49 (= 0%)  O 1/49 (≈ 2%)  O 4/49 (≈ 8%)  O 7/49 (≈ 14%) 
j. What is the probability of the minimum investment value to prevent damage being less 
or equal €120? (please tick the correct answer) 
O 0/49 (= 0%)  O 28/49 (≈ 57%)  O 43/49 (≈ 88%) O 49/49 (= 100%) 
k. What is the probability of the minimum investment value to prevent damage being less 
or equal €180? (please tick the correct answer) 
O 0/49 (= 0%)  O 28/49 (≈ 57%)  O 43/49 (≈ 88%) O 49/49 (= 100%) 
l. Assume that the group has invested a total of €100 over the ten rounds. The draw 
shows that the minimum total investment value to avoid damage is €160. Does the damage 
occur in this case? (please tick the correct answer) 
O Yes   O No  
m. Assume that the group has invested a total of €80 over the ten rounds. The draw shows 
that the minimum total investment value to avoid damage is €20. Does the damage occur in 
this case?  (please tick the correct answer) 
O Yes   O No 
 Please give us a hand signal after you have answered all control questions. We will 
come to you and check the answers. The game will begin after we have checked the answers 
of all players and answered any questions you may have. Good luck! 
